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BAUXITES' "INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY INTEREST" AND THE
RIGHT TO CONTROL AMENABILITY TO SUIT IN PERSONAL
JURISDICTION ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION

Traditional analyses of the proper exercise by states of in personam
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants have focused on four distinct
interests: those of the plaintiff,' the forum state, 2 the defendant 3 and
1. A plaintiff is interested in having his suit adjudicated in a convenient forum,
usually near his domicile or principal place of business. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 259 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the domicile of the plaintiff
was accessible to all parties and therefore was a proper forum); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957) (discussing relative conveniences of
defendant in litigating in the forum and of plaintiff proceeding in a different forum):
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11. 2d 432, 443, 176
N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961) (court taking into account plaintiff's residency in the forum
state); Note, The Long Arn Shrinks: The Supreme Court and the Problem of the
Nonresident Defendant in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 58 Den. L.J.
667, 677 (1981) (discussing the analysis in Gray of the conveniences of the parties).
The distance a plaintiff would have to travel if jurisdiction were to be denied is a
relevant consideration. Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 1982);
Note, Fifth Amendment Due Process Limitations on Nationwide Federal Jurisdiction, 61 B.U.L. Rev. 403, 424 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Nationwide Jurisdiction].
A plaintiff is also interested in a location that minimizes the costs of litigation. See
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) ("When claims were
small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of
bringing an action in a foreign forum .
): Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 508 (1947) (discussing costs of litigation in the context of venue): Woods,
Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest
PredictionRegarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 Ariz. L. Rev.
861, 892-93 (1978) (minimizing the cost of litigation to the plaintiff may be more
important when the defendant is insured): Nationwide Jurisdiction, supra, at 424
(discussing litigation costs of both the plaintiff and defendant). When a plaintiff sues
multiple defendants, his interest may be in suing all of them in the same court. The
plaintiff seeks to join all defendants in one suit to avoid inconsistent results or
duplicative litigation. See Henry R. Jahn & Sons v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855,
862, 323 P.2d 437, 441 (1958); Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme
Court's New Jurisdictional Theory, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 19, 46 (1980), see also Jay,
"Minimum'Contacts"as a Unified Theory of PersonalJurisdiction:
A Reappraisal.59
N.C.L. Rev. 429, 449 (1981) ("Realizing the possibility of multiple defendants pointing the finger at each other, plaintiffs in the [position of those in World-Wide] may
be forced to a distant forum, thereby accepting the financial consequences.").
2. The forum state is primarily interested in providing resident plaintiffs with a
convenient forum, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 223 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussing ways in which states' interests have been
expressed in the past); see Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and PersonalJurisdiction: A TheoreticalEvaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1112, 1139 (1981), and having its
body of law effectively protect them, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 223 (1977)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); NationwideJurisdiction, supra
note 1, at 419; see Redish, supra, at 1139. In appropriate cases the forum's interest
also extends to overseeing the disposition of land and personalty within the state. See
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958); Quasha v. Shale Dev. Corp., 667 F.2d
483, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1982).
3. A defendant wishes to avoid the costs of litigating in a distant forum, Kulko
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97 (1978) (noting substantial financial strain that
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the "interstate judicial system."' 4 Yet the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, which governs the exercise by states of
personal jurisdiction, has been interpreted to require more than a
simple weighing of these interests. 5
The earliest Supreme Court analysis of jurisdiction after the passage
of the fourteenth amendment recognized certain limitations on the
sovereign power of the states. 6 These limitations have been refined
into an insistence on an affiliation between a defendant and the forum
state. Originally, the standard of affiliation was actual presence of
the defendant or its real property in the forum state. 8 The growth of
corporations made this standard inoperable for two reasons. First, a
corporation does not exist in the same sense that a person exists, and
therefore, is incapable of "actual presence." 9 Second, a corporation is
a creature of local law and was originally deemed not to have a legal
existence apart from the state of its incorporation. 10 Consequently, the
Court adopted a standard that evaluated the required affiliation in

would be put on New York defendant by having to litigate in the forum California);
see Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Products Liability Actions: An 'Effect Test'
Analysis of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 179, 201
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Effect Test], and the risk of the application of laws that
the defendant did not consult in fashioning his conduct, see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 225 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Woods,
supra note 1, at 896, see also von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1174-75 (1966) (discussing, in light of
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the unfairness that can result when jurisdictional analysis is totally separated from choice of law analysis).
4. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (interest of the "interstate judicial system" lies in "obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies"). The efficiency to which the World-Wide Court alluded is
achieved through the "orderly administration of the laws." Id. at 297 (quoting
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
5. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980);
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
245-46 (1958); see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1878).
6. Pennover v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878). In Pennoyer, the Court relied on
the writings of Justice Story on international conflicts of law. Id. at 722-23; see J.
Story, Conflicts of Law ch. 2 (7th ed. 1872). The Court established a system under
which "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory," but in which "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction
and authority over persons or property without its territory." 95 U.S. at 722.
7. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)
("[T]he Due Process Clause 'does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the
state has no contacts, ties, or relations."') (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
8. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722, 723 (1878).
9. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 12.14, at 630-31 (2d ed. 1977).
10. See id.; C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1066 (1969).
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terms of the defendant's contacts with the forum state, rather than in
terms of the defendant's actual presence within the forum's borders. "
The contacts had to be significant enough that forcing the defendant
to litigate in the forum state would not "offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' "12
This contacts test, announced in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,'" made it easier for plaintiffs to obtain jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants than did the actual presence test.14 But the
principles of the contacts test-fair play and substantial justice-were
so general that state courts could apply them to favor either
defendants or plaintiffs.' 5 Depending on the number and quality of
contacts required to be shown, a plaintiff enjoyed either greater or
lesser ease in obtaining jurisdiction, and a defendant, greater or lesser
control over its amenability to suit.16
11. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
12. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957)
(noting trend toward expanding the scope of state court jurisdiction); Louis, The
Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds its Reach: A Comment on WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 407,
407-08 (1980) (noting unparalleled expansion of state.judicial jurisdiction after InternationalShoe); Note, Retracting the Long Arm: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 22 B.C.L. Rev. 385, 386 (1981) ("This test [of
InternationalShoe] greatly extended the reach of state judicial power.") [hereinafter
cited as Retracting the Long Arm]; Nationwide Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 407
("[Tihe Court recognized the need to expand the scope of state court jurisdiction, and
abandoned Pennoyer's jurisdictional requirements of presence and consent."); Note,
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: A Limit to the Expansion of Long-Arm
Jurisdiction,69 Calif. L. Rev. 611, 611 (1981) ("Beginning with [InternationalShoe]
this concept of physical power over property yielded to an expanded view of the
ability of the states to exercise personal jurisdiction......) [hereinafter cited as
Long-Arm Jurisdiction].
15. Retracting the Long Arm, supra note 14, at 390 (in light of Hanson and
McGee, courts using contacts test did what they thought was fair under the circumstances); Long-Arm Jurisdiction,supra note 14, at 615-16 (discussing the "perplexing
minimum contacts standard" and the inconsistent state court results after Hanson
and McGee); Note, The Long-Arm Reach of the Courts Under the Effect Test After
Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 Va. L. Rev. 175, 179-81 (1979) (discussing varied
application of the contacts test in products liability cases) [hereinafter cited as Reach
of the Courts].
16. In the space of six months the Court decided two cases in which the number
and quality of contacts demanded varied greatly. In McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the Court applied a contacts analysis that accorded great
weight to the interest of the forum state. Id. at 223; see Comment, Federalism, Due
Process, and Minimum Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80
Colum. L. Rev. 1341, 1345-46 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Federalism]. The Court
sustained jurisdiction over the defendant insurer whose only contact with the plaintiff claimant and the forum state was its correspondence concerning the plaintiff's
claim under a life insurance policy. 355 U.S. at 221-22. To justify the forum's exercise
of jurisdiction the Court referred to a statute of the forum state in which the state
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After International Shoe, some courts allowed the exercise of
jurisdiction if a defendant's contacts were a mere "foreseeable"
consequence of its activities.' 7 Courts using this standard reasoned
that the controlling interests in the analysis are those of the plaintiff
and the forum state in adjudicating the controversy in the state where
the injury occurred.' 8 Other courts required a higher quality of
contacts, and exercised jurisdiction only when a defendant's contacts
were the result of its "purposeful availment" of the benefits and
protections of the forum's laws.' 9 Courts using this standard reasoned

expressed a specific interest in providing a forum for claims against out-of-state
insurance companies such as the defendant. Id. at 223; see Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 252 (1958) (Court noting special statute in McGee as basis for distinguishing facts before it from those in McGee). The analysis in McGee de-emphasized the
quantity and quality of contacts: There was only one transaction, and its purposefulness was never explored. 355 U.S. at 221-22.
Six months after its decision in McGee, the Court did concentrate on the quality
and quantity of the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see Federalism, supra, at 1351. The Court's analysis was
favorable to defendants because it required that all contacts represent efforts of the
defendant to purposefully avail itself of the benefits and protections of doing business
in the forum state. Id.; see Long-Arm Jurisdiction,supra note 14, at 615.
17. See, e.g., Ajax Realty Corp. v. J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818, 822-23 (4th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Sheridan v. Cadet Chem. Corp., 25
Conn. Supp. 17, 22-23, 195 A.2d 766, 768-69 (Super. Ct. 1963); Andersen v. National Presto Indus., 257 Iowa 911, 918-19, 135 N.W.2d 639, 643 (1965); Cole v.
Doe, 77 Mich. App. 138, 143, 258 N.W.2d 165, 168 (1977); Ehlers v. U.S. Heating &
Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 61-62, 124 N.W.2d 824, 827 (1963); Roy v.
North Am. Newspaper Alliance Inc., 106 N.H. 92, 97-98, 205 A.2d 844, 847-48
(1964); see also Currie, The Growth of the Long Arn: Eight Years of Extended
Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 533; Louis, supra note 14, at 408, 425;
Retracting the Long Arm, supra note 14, at 391; Reach of the Courts, supra note 15,
at 179-80.
18. See, e.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965);
Rosen v. Savant Instriments, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 232, 234-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1967);
Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90, 99-100 (S.D. Tex. 1963);
American Type Founders Co. v. Mueller Color Plate Co., 171 F. Supp. 249, 252
(E.D. Wis. 1959); Sheridan v. Cadet Chem. Corp., 25 Conn. Supp. 17, 21, 195 A.2d
766, 768 (Super. Ct. 1963); Hull v. Gamblin, 241 A.2d 739, 742-43 (D.C. 1968);
Andersen v. National Presto Indus., 257 Iowa 911, 919, 135 N.W.2d 639, 643 (1965);
Fove v. Consolidated Baling Mach. Co., 229 A.2d 196, 200 (Me. 1967); Woods v.
Edgewater Amusement Park, 381 Mich. 559, 568-69, 165 N.W.2d 12, 16-17 (1969);
Cole v. Doe, 77 Mich. App. 138, 143, 258 N.W.2d 165, 168 (1977); Dahlberg Co. v.
Western Hearing Aid Center, Ltd., 259 Minn. 330, 334-35, 107 N.W.2d 381, 384,
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 961 (1961); Roy v. North Am. Newspaper Alliance, Inc., 106
N.H. 92, 97-98, 205 A.2d 844, 847-48 (1964); Reach of the Courts, supra note 15, at
179-80.
19. See, e.g., Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th
Cir. 1968): Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp 165, 169-71 (D.
Minn. 1969); Khalaf v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 62 Mich. App. 678, 681-82, 233
N.W.2d 696, 697-98 (1975), aff'd, 404 Mich. 134, 273 N.W.2d 811 (1978); LonginesWittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 458, 209 N.E.2d
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that due process considerations place a limit on the scope of the
forum's jurisdictional
power to protect its interests and those of the
20
plaintiff.
Apparently concerned with state courts' use of the "foreseeability"
standard, the Supreme Court in 1980, in World-Wide Volklswagen
Corp. v. Woodson,2 adopted a contacts test that applied the higher
quality "purposeful availment" standard. 22 Using this standard in the
test, the Court held that the long arm statute of the forum state,
Oklahoma, did not reach the New York defendants: The retail sale in
New York of a car that later caused injury in Oklahoma did not
amount to a purposeful availment of the laws of the state into which
the car was driven. 23 By limiting the reach of the forum's long arm
statute, the Court imposed restraints on the sovereign power of the
forum state. 24 The Court stated that the purpose of imposing these
restraints on the forum state was to preserve the principles of
'25
"interstate federalism.
68, 76, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965); W.B. Dunavant & Co.
v. Perkins, 498 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tenn. 1973); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123
Vt. 461, 464-65, 194 A.2d 568, 570-71 (1963).
20, See supra note 19.
21. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
22. See id. at 294, 297. In World-Wide the Court discussed the relaxation of the
limits on state court jurisdiction before and after McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and concluded that interstate federalism principles prevent
the exercise of jurisdiction even when all the other interests would otherwise favor
the exercise of jurisdiction. 444 U.S. at 292-93, 294. The Court sought to arrive at a
result that was generally fair but which was based on an approach that was "'sufficiently clear and workable [so] that the states, despite their contrary self-interest,
would effectively be bound by it or could easily be held to it." Louis, supra note 14,
at 409; see also Federalism, supra note 16, at 1357 (suggesting that Court's measures
were intended to curb what it perceived as the unrestricted use of foreseeability
criteria in contacts analysis); Long-Arm Jurisdiction,supra note 14, at 611 (discussing how Court's higher standard "further limited the ability of the state courts to
exercise jurisdiction").
23. 444 U.S. at 295-97.
24. Id. at 294; Hendrickson v. Reg 0 Co., 657 F.2d 9, 14 (3d Cir. 1981); see
Louis, supra note 14, at 409 (noting that "[b]y 1975, state long arm jurisdiction and
choice-of-law doctrine had enjoyed three decades of unimpeded growth towards,
and arguably sometimes beyond, the limits of due process"). But see Jay, supra note
1, at 457-58 (state courts were more constrained than suggested by Professor Louis).
Regardless of the dimensions of this growth, the majority of the Court in WorldWide perceived that state courts were going too far in products liability cases. See
444 U.S. at 295-96 (discussing permissiveness of foreseeability standard); Federalism,
supra note 16, at 1357 ("The Court was clearly concerned that unrestricted use of the
foreseeability criterion would subject sellers of goods to an extremely wide scope of in
personam jurisdiction.").
25. 444 U.S. at 294 ("[T]he Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a
valid judgment."); see Federalism, supra note 16, at 1355 (Court's "definition of the
federalism limitation of due process is phrased in terms of implied reciprocal restric-
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In footnote ten of Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee,2 6 however, the Court stated that "[t]he restriction
on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp....
must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause." 2 7 This removal
of interstate federalism as a justification for using the "purposeful
availment" standard in the contacts analysis has led some courts to
revert to a contacts analysis that favors the interests of plaintiffs and
forum states.28' This analysis weighs all the remaining interests, but
fails to appreciate the constitutional function that a defendant's
individual9 liberty interest, recognized in Bauxites, has in contacts
2
analysis.
This Note argues that a defendant's individual liberty and property
interests shield it from undue burdens of litigating in a distant forum
and allow it to control its amenability to suit in that forum.
Examining the rise and fall of federalism in contacts analysis, Part I
shows how Bauxites replaces the interests of "interstate federalism"
with the "individual liberty interest" of the defendant. It further
demonstrates that the effective means of protecting the relevant
constitutional interests after Bauxites lies in the retention of the
"purposeful availment" standard in the contacts analysis. Part II sets
forth a proposed contacts analysis that is consistent with Bauxites,
tions on the power of sister states, a consequence of the territorial divisions among
them."). In his dissent, Justice Brennan contended that "the Court is allowing
defendants to assert the sovereign rights of their home states." 444 U.S. at 311-12
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982).
27. Id. at 2105 n.10.
28. See Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 523 (5th Cir. 1982) (court evaluating
contacts in terms of fairness but jurisdiction not allowed). Some courts are apparently
retreating from the sovereignty analysis, yet not citing to Bauxites. Vishay Intertech.,
Inc. v. Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1068-69 (4th Cir. 1982) (court expressing
greater concern for fairness than for purposeful availment); Cives Corp. v. American
Elec. Power Co., 550 F. Supp. 1155, 1157-58 (D. Me. 1982) (court applying interest
analysis derived from World-Wide. threshold evaluation of defendant's contacts
reduced to one factor of inquiry into overall reasonableness).
29. Courts reverting to an interest analysis present the Supreme Court with the
same problem that prompted its decision in World-Wide: the zealousness with which
state courts assert state interests. See Louis, supra note 14, at 431-32. The requirements of personal jurisdiction, however, involve not only a weighing of the relevant
interests but also a limitation on the power of the forum state. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text. The contacts test of World-Wide performed these two related
functions by protecting the defendant from an inconvenient forum and by ensuring
that states do not exceed "the limits imposed on them . . . as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980). This same power restraint will continue to exist after Bauxites in order to
preserve a defendant's individual liberty interest. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2105 n.10 (1982). Therefore, the test
requires more than a simple weighing of conveniences.
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illustrates the practical application of the analysis, and reveals the
flaws of analyses currently used by courts and proposed by
commentators.
I.

THE DIFFERING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR USE OF THE PURPOSEFUL
AVAILMENT STANDARD IN CONTACTS ANALYSIS

A. World-Wide: The "InterstateFederalism"Justification
30
The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
interpreted the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to
restrict states' exercise of in personam jurisdiction only to defendants
who had "purposefully availed" themselves of the forum's laws. 3' This
high quality of affiliation between the defendant and the forum was
considered necessary primarily to preserve the balance of power
shared by the states in the federal system. 32 "The sovereignty of each
State," according to the Court, "implied a limitation on the
sovereignty of all of its sister States-a limitation express or implicit in
both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment. ' 33 This principle of "interstate federalism 34 dominated
35
the resulting jurisdictional analysis conducted by the Court.
In World-Wide the Court announced a contacts test that had two
steps. In the first step, a court would have to determine whether the
defendant had purposefully affiliated itself with the forum state. 3
Absent such purposeful availment, a court would lack the power to
hear the case and the analysis would end. 37 If, on the other hand, a
30. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
31. See id. at 297 (Court citing to that portion of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958), which equated a defendant's activities within a forum state with the
invocation of the protections afforded by that state's laws).
32. The Court in World-Wide linked interstate federalism concerns to the requirement of some affiliation between the defendant and the forum state. 444 U.S. at
294. The Court defined the quality of this affiliation in terms of purposeful availment. Id. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)): see
Federalism, supra note 16, at 1349-50; Retracting the Long Arm, supra note 14, at
398.
33. 444 U.S. at 293. The Court indicated that these sovereign power limitations
inhered in the federal system, which envisions states retaining most of their sovereign
attributes.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 291, 292-94.
36. See id. at 297. See supra note 31 (discussing the relationship between the
purposeful availment standard and the principle of interstate federalism). The purposeful availment standard has been described by the Court as a means of "ensuring
the 'orderly administration of the laws,' ""and as an instrument for providing defendants with guidance in tailoring their conduct to avoid amenability to suit. WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
37. Without acknowledging the constitutional justification for a threshold determination of the forum's jurisdictional power, see Retracting the Long Arm, supra
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court were to find that the defendant had purposefully affiliated itself
with the forum state, the court would have the power to hear the
case. 3 It would not necessarily be able to exercise jurisdiction,
however, until it had conducted the second step of the analysis. In
that step, it would have to assess the burdens of litigation on the
parties39 by balancing the defendant's inconvenience in litigating in
the forum with the inconvenience to the plaintiff of litigating in an
alternative forum. 40 In conducting this step of the analysis, courts
have seemingly presumed the propriety of exercising jurisdiction
41
unless the burden on the defendant would be substantial.
The primacy of the interstate federalism principle, acting as the
justification for the threshold "power" step 42 in the analysis, was
emphasized by the Court:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State;
even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to
the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an
act to divest the
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes
43
State of its power to render a valid judgment.
Thus, any restraint on the power of the forum state would be the
of a court's protection of the principle of "interstate federalproduct
ism." 44

note 14, at 386-87 (author recognizing this threshold determination as the purposeful
availment inquiry and further stating that "[i]f this factor was not satisfied, all other
inquiries [become] immaterial"), a court could resolve all jurisdictional questions in
terms of fairness or reasonableness.
38. See 444 U.S. at 297-98.
39. Arguably the burdens on a defendant that both the majority and dissenting
opinions describe can be characterized as impairments of property interests. See id.
at 292; id. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 291-92; Louis, supra note 14, at 407, 421, 430.
41. See, e.g., Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878, 881 (10th Cir. 1982)
(court finding substantial burdens on the defendant); Quasha v. Shale Dev. Corp.,
667 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1982) (court expressing doubt that defendant's domicile
was more convenient for defendant to litigate in than the forum); Insurance Co. of
N.Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1982) (court denying
jurisdiction because of substantial burdens on the defendant).
42. See Retracting the Long Arm, supra note 14, at 386-87. "Where a contact
between the defendant and the forum is weak, concern for the maintenance of a
genuinely federal system of government may foreclose jurisdiction irrespective of
other fairness interests." Id. at 398; Jay, supra note 1, at 438; Louis, supra note 14, at
407.
43. 444 U.S. at 294.
44. See Jay, supra note 1, at 441 (describing application of the analysis in WorldWide as "directed entirely toward the 'sovereignty' limitation"); Retracting the Long
Arm, supra note 14, at 386-87 (arguing that courts must first determine whether a
finding of jurisdiction would offend principles of "interstate federalism"). In some
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Although this analysis focused on the interests of sovereigns, its
results directly affected the individual interests at stake. It established
a restraint on the power of the forum state that allowed a defendant to
tailor its conduct to avoid amenability to suit. 45 Arguably, a defendant's control over amenability to suit was not a mere by-product of the
power restraints on the states that were imposed to further the interests of interstate federalism. Rather, concern for preserving this control dictated the imposition of these restraints, and the furtherance of
the interests of interstate federalism merely justified the imposition. 46
Regardless of the reason for imposing restraints on the forum's
power, the overall effect of the analysis in World-Wide was to place
the closely allied interests of the defendant and interstate federalism
ahead of those of a plaintiff and forum. 47 Consequently, the analysis
foreclosed the option that had been available to state courts since
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington 4 of applying a contacts test to
protect the49interests of plaintiffs and forums instead of those of the
defendant.
B. Bauxites: The "IndividualLiberty Interest" Justification
The reaction to the jurisdiction analysis in World-Wide was
immediate and varied. Commentators questioned both the need for

cases, courts seem to rely heavily on principles of fairness or reasonableness to find no
jurisdiction even though the defendant has engaged in activities that are apparently
purposeful availments. See Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878, 881 (10th Cir.
1982); Insurance Co. of N.Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir.
1981). Additionally, jurisdiction may be refused if the forum state has no demonstrable interest in hearing the case. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33,
36 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
45. The Court found that this restraint on the power of the forum state was
mandated by the due process clause. 444 U.S. at 294. The Court concluded: 'The
Due Process Clause, by ensuring the 'orderly administration of the laws,' . . . gives a
degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct
will and will not render them liable to suit." Id. at 297 (quoting International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
46. See Retracting the Long Arm, supra note 14, at 386-87 (arguing that federalism standard was implemented to combat defendants' inability to predict where they
might be held amenable to suit).
47. See Louis, supra note 14, at 430 & n. 161 (pointing out the difference between
the majority's analysis in World-Wide and the dissent's interest analysis is the relative
importance assigned to factors and interests); Federalism, supra note 16, at 1357,
1361 (noting that federalism interest is higher than that of a forum state, and then
aligning it with a defendant's interest); Retracting the Long Arm, supra note 14, at
387, 405 (noting shift in World-Wide from an equal weighing of interests to a
threshold inquiry made in the name of federalism and for the benefit of defendant).
48. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
49. See supra note 17 for examples of courts using this option.
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such a pro-defendant contacts test 50 and the constitutional foundation
on which it rested. 5' The sharpest criticism focused on the lack of any
the concept of
constitutional or historical justification for including
52
interstate federalism in the due process inquiry.
The federal circuit courts, for unstated reasons, did not discuss the
concepts of sovereignty, 53 but did apply the "purposeful availment"

50. Effect Test, supra note 3, at 204-05 (foreseeability would have adequately
protected the defendant); Note, Personal Jurisdiction:Refinement in Light of Rush
v. Savehuk and World-Wide Volksvagen v. Woodson, 32 Baylor L. Rev. 303, 312
(1980) (arguing that the interstate federalism element of the in personam test would
make a violation of the test tantamount to a judgment rendered without subject
matter jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as Refinement]; Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra
note 14, at 622 (restrictive approach does not take into account the decreased burdens
on a defendant due to modern transportation and communication systems).
51. Braveman, Interstate FederalismAnd Personal Jurisdiction, 33 Syracuse L.
Rev. 533, 554 (1982) (noting great inconsistency in allowing a sovereign interest to be
waived by the defendant's voluntary appearance in the forum state action); Redish,
supra note 2, at 1120-33 (pointing out that Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), was
not based on precedent, and interstate federalism principles are not found in the
fourteenth amendment).
52. See Redish, supra note 2, at 1120-33.
53. First Nat'l Bank v. J.W. Brewer Tire Co., 680 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam); Halstead Hosp. Inc. v. Northern Bank Note Co., 680 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir.
1982); Jadair, Inc. v. Walt Keeler Co., 679 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 258 (1982); Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1982):
Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982); Leney v.
Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1982); Quasha v. Shale Dev. Corp., 667
F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1982); Shanks v. Westland Equip. & Parts Co., 668 F.2d 1165
(10th Cir. 1982); Kimbrel v. Neiman-Marcus, 665 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1981); Schwilm
v. Holbrook, 661 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1981); Kransco Mfg. Inc. v. Markwitz, 656 F.2d
1376 (9th Cir. 1981); Austin v. North Am. Forest Prods., 656 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1981); Prejean v. Sonatrach Inc., 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981); Hendrickson v. Reg
0 Co., 657 F.2d 9 (3d Cir. 1981); Willis v. Willis, 655 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Koster v. Automark Inalus., 640 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1981); Nu-Way Sys. v. Belmont
Mktg., Inc., 635 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1980); Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed &
Fertilizer Corp., 633 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1980); Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant
Prods., 619 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1980).
In some cases involving foreign defendants, courts naturally have not discussed
"interstate federalism," but have applied the purposeful availment standard in the
contacts test nonetheless. Taubler v. Giraud, 655 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1981); Puerto
Rico v. The S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (ist cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
912 (1981); Nova Biomedical Corp. v. Moller, 629 F.2d 190 (1st Cir. 1980); Neiman
v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 619 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1980).
Two federal circuit courts have discussed sovereignty or interstate federalism
elements as relevant. Paolino v. Channel Home Centers, 668 F.2d 721, 724 (3d Cir.
1981); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th
Cir. 1981). In Paolino, the court reasoned that because both the defendant's state and
the plaintiff's state recognized trade secrets, neither would be offended by the adjudication of the suit in the other's courts. 668 F.2d at 724. In Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
the court concluded that "foreign nations present a higher sovereignty barrier than
that between two states within our union." 649 F.2d at 1272.
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standard. 54 Although the lower courts were applying the practical
aspects of the test correctly, and were achieving its underlying
purpose,55 the Supreme Court was forced to examine the
constitutional justification upon which the World-Wide contacts test
was based.
In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 56 the defendant attempted to escape jurisdiction by not
cooperating with a jurisdictional discovery order.57 The specific
problem presented to the Court was whether the defendant, by not
cooperating with the court order, had waived its right to object to
jurisdiction, thereby justifying the forum's exercise of in personam
5
jurisdiction over it. 1
The inclusion of the interstate federalism principle in personal
jurisdiction analysis had created an unforeseen dilemma:
[Iff the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction
on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to
waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions
cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual
can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be
protected .59

Recognizing this dilemma, the Court had no alternative but to remove
the principle from the contacts analysis. It did so by stating: "[The
due process clause] is the only source of the personal jurisdiction
requirement and the clause itself makes no mention of federalism
60
concerns."

In two Third Circuit cases, federalism concerns were discussed but found to be
irrelevant. Horne v. Adolf Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1982) (federal
statute involves no interstate federalism concerns); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d
1226, 1267 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (remarking on the unlikelihood
"that any state's law could have controlled defendant's conduct or that any state
would be interested in protecting defendants from liability for constitutional torts"),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
54. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. J.W. Brewer Tire Co., 680 F.2d 1123, 1126 (6th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Halstead Hosp., Inc. v. Northern Bank Note Co., 680 F.2d
1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1982); Jadair, Inc. v. Walt Keeler Co., 679 F.2d 131, 133-34
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 258 (1982); Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 679
F.2d 1051, 1061 (3d Cir. 1982); Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677
F.2d 651, 654-55 (8th Cir. 1982); Quasha v. Shale Dev. Corp., 667 F.2d 483, 486
(5th Cir. 1982); Kimbrel v. Neiman-Marcus, 665 F.2d 480, 482 (4th Cir. 1981):
Puerto Rico v. The S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 669-70 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.

denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
55. By restricting the assertion of jurisdiction by state courts, see supra note 45,
courts were allowing defendants to tailor their conduct to avoid jurisdiction.
56. 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982).
57. Id. at 2102, 2104.
58. Id. at 2101-2103.
59. Id. at 2105 n.10.
60. Id.
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Thus, in its closer examination of the due process clause, the Court
in Bauxites found what it deemed the genuine justification for restraining a forum's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a defendant-the defendant's own "individual liberty interest." 6' By removing
62
the 104-year-old sovereignty concepts from the jurisdiction analysis,
the Court made in personam jurisdiction truly personal.
II. A PROPER CONTACTS ANALYSIS A~rER BAUXITES:
ITS THEORY, APPLICATION AND SUPERIORITY To
OTHER JURISDICTION ANALYSES

Now that the Court has changed the justification for the purposeful
availment standard, questions arise as to the proper practical
application of the contacts analysis. These questions can be answered
only after examining the meaning of "individual liberty interest."
A. Theory of the Bauxites Contacts Analysis:
Individual Liberty Interest
The individual liberty interest has never been defined in the context
of in personam jurisdiction.6 3 It can best be understood by examining
the implications of the role it now has of imposing the same power
restraints that were imposed by the interstate federalism principle in
World-Wide. 4 The power restraints inherent in the World-Wide
61. Id. at 2104 & n.10.
62. The concepts of sovereignty and territoriality were first applied to due process jurisdictional analysis in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). In Bauxites, the
Court apparently deemed it necessary to remove "interstate federalism" notions from
the analysis in order to reach the conclusion that the defendant had constructively
waived his right not to be subjected to the jurisdiction of the forum state court. 102 S.
Ct. at 2105 & n.10; see Braveman, supra note 51, at 554 (discussing the inconsistency
of the sovereignty component of personal jurisdiction in light of a defendant's ability
to waive personal jurisdiction). Thus, because the removal of sovereignty was necessary to the Court's holding, the Court's discussion of the point represents more than
dicta. It should be noted that interstate federalism principles continue as a relevant
concern in choice of law analysis, which is not limited to the due process clause. See
Note, Removing the Cloak of Personal Jurisdiction From Choice of Law Analysis:
Pendent Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 127,
157 (1982).
63. The term "individual liberty interest" does not appear in any of the Court's in
personam jurisdiction cases. It has appeared, however, in other contexts. Youngberg
v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982) (mentally retarded individual, involuntarily
committed to state institution, does not lose "all substantive liberty interests under
the Fourteenth Amendment"); id. passim; Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1981) ("interest in personal liberty" is implicated in appointing
counsel for indigent if latter stands to lose his physical liberty); cf. Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979) (Court establishing higher standard of proof in
civil commitment proceedings to prevent individual's "loss of liberty").
64. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. at
2105 n.10 ("The restriction on state sovereign power described in [World-wide],

1290

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

analysis protected the interests of interstate federalism, and the
defendant's right to control its amenability to suit was a by-product
thereof.65 When the Court removed interstate federalism as a
justification, the interests of the co-equal sovereigns disappeared. The
defendant's right to control, however, was dependent only on the
continued existence of the power restraints. By continuing to impose
these power restraints with the constitutional justification of
individual liberty, the Court preserved the defendant's right to control
its amenability to suit. The defendant's right is therefore now
protected from infringement not as a by-product of a sovereign's right
but directly by the individual's own constitutional interest.
The individual liberty interest encompasses the right to control
one's conduct to avoid amenability to suit. This control can exist only
when the results of a contacts analysis are predictable.6 6 Because the
purposeful availment standard is satisfied only when the defendant
has taken affirmative steps toward affiliating itself with the forum
state, the results of a contacts test using this standard are the most
predictable from the vantage of the prospective defendant trying to
67
tailor its conduct to avoid amenability to suit.
Thus, the two-step format of contacts analysis that the Court
announced in World-Wide remains intact after Bauxites.6 8 The
individual liberty interest justifies the preservation of the threshold
inquiry into the defendant's purposeful availment. In fact, the
Bauxites Court expressly stated that restraints on the sovereign power
of forum states that may result from conducting this inquiry should
continue. 69 The second step of the analysis-the inquiry into the
burdens of litigation-was unaffected by Bauxites.70 Nevertheless,
must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by
the Due Process Clause.").
65. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see
Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651, 655 n.4 (8th Cir. 1982)
(discussing the predictability afforded by the purposeful availment standard);
Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956) (dismissing
jurisdiction based only on a foreseeable contact because it would lead to the destruction of the orderly and fair administration of the laws).
66. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
67. See Louis, supra note 14, at 431 (describing the purposeful availment standard as part of a "mechanical approach [that] will usually produce the right result,
or will at least produce few very wrong and unfair ones"). But see Mountaire Feeds,
Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651, 655 n.4 (8th Cir. 1982) (questioning the
correlation among due process clause, predictability and purposeful availment).
68. See Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct.
2099, 2104 n.10 (1982) (Court reiterating the two-prong test announced in WorldWide).
69. Id. at 2105 n.10.
70. After recognizing that restrictions on the judicial power of the states function
to preserve a defendant's individual liberty interest, the Court reaffirmed the principles of InternationalShoe as the foundation of the personal jurisdictional requirement. Id. at 2104-2105.
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Bauxites' alteration of the theoretical underpinnings of the analysis'
threshold "power" step may, in certain cases, lead a court applying
the analysis to results different from those that would be reached
under the World-Wide analysis.
B. Application of the Bauxites ContactsAnalysis
Courts applying a Bauxites contacts analysis in products liability
cases like World-Wide should still find that jurisdiction does not
exist. 7' The Bauxites analysis may direct the exercise of jurisdiction,
however, in cases in which the World-Wide analysis would not-cases
in which a defendant's contacts are attributable to a contract.
In both kinds of cases, a court should determine, in its threshold
inquiry, whether the defendant's actions represent a purposeful
affiliation with the forum state.7 2 Bearing in mind that this insistence
on purposeful availment is intended to protect the defendant's
individual liberty interest, the court should concentrate on the
defendant's ability to control the activities that are alleged to
constitute purposeful availment.7 3 A court should find that activities
are no longer purposeful at the point when the defendant loses control
over them.
In products liability cases with fact patterns similar to the one in
World-Wide, the defendant possesses control over the product up
until the first retail sale.74 Until that point the defendant has
knowledge of the movement of the product and the opportunity to
direct that movement by contract.7 5 After the first retail sale, it is the
consumer, not the defendant, who directs the movement of the
product.7 6 Therefore, if the purchasing consumer moves with the
product to a state with which the defendant has no contacts, and is
injured therein by the product, the consumer should not be able to
obtain jurisdiction over the defendant in that state. A court's assertion
of jurisdiction in such a case would deprive the defendant of the
individual liberty it likely exercised when establishing the chain of
distribution of its product. A consumer would have to return to the

71. See supra text accompanying note 23.
72. See supra text accompanying note 36.
73. See supra notes 45-46.
74. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98
(1980).
75. See Shanks v. Westland Equip. & Parts Co., 668 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir.
1982); Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 633 F.2d 155, 159 (9th
Cir. 1980); Puerto Rico v. The S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 669-70 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 199200 (5th Cir. 1980).
76. See 444 U.S. at 296; Puerto Rico v. The S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652,
667-68 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Louis, supra note 14, at
417.
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place of purchase or to another suitable forum in order to obtain
jurisdiction over the defendant. Another suitable forum would be a
state with which the defendant conducts systematic and continuous
relations. 77 In such a forum, the defendant avails itself of substantial
benefits and should anticipate having to litigate there. 8
The premeditated business decisions at issue in most contract cases
evince a high level of control over the entire transaction. Unlike the
defendants in products liability cases, the defendants in contract cases
know the identity of the plaintiff and the state in which it is located.79
In this context, contacts in furtherance of a contract should be viewed
as purposeful and thus sufficient predicates for the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction by a foreign forum, but only on a cause of
action related to the contract.8 0 Courts need not evaluate, as they did
under the World-Wide analysis, the wide variety of factors that were
looked to in order to establish the existence of purposeful availment. 8'
77. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-47 (1952);
Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1982); Paolino v. Channel
Home Centers, 668 F.2d 721, 724 (3d Cir. 1981); Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652
F.2d 1260, 1269 (5th Cir. 1981); Nova Biomedical Corp. v. Moller, 629 F.2d 190,
193 n.5 (1st Cir. 1980); Woods, supra note 1, at 866.
78. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980);
Shanks v. Westland Equip. & Parts Co., 668 F.2d 1165, 1168 (10th Cir. 1982).
79. See Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651, 655-56 (8th
Cir. 1982); Quasha v. Shale Dev. Corp., 667 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 1982); Kimbrel
v. Neiman-Marcus, 665 F.2d 480, 481 (4th Cir. 1981); Neiman v. Rudolf Wolff &
Co., 619 F.2d 1189, 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1980).
80. The purposeful availment requirement would preserve the same power restraints as World-Wide, and function to preserve individual liberty. See Insurance
Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2105 n. 10 (1982).
The analysis of the burdens of litigating is still the second step of a contacts analysis.
See id. The single contact must be related to the litigation, or the whole concept of
control would be rendered meaningless.
81. Factors that were used by the courts after World-Wide to classify the defendant's activity as purposeful included: the subject matter of the contract, see, e.g.,
Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878, 881 (10th Cir. 1982) (no purposeful
availment by the defendant bank given the mobile character of a letter of credit);
Quasha v. Shale Dev. Corp., 667 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1982) (purposeful availment in defendant's purchase of land in light of future regulation of ownership by
local laws); Schwilm v. Holbrook, 661 F.2d 12, 15 (3d Cir. 1981) (no purposeful
availment; "Unlike a commercial enterprise, which may tailor its business to avoid
dealing with out of state customers, a physician, and especially one on a hospital
emergency room staff, is obliged to treat whoever requires medical attention."), the
place where it was negotiated, see Kimbrel v. Neiman-Marcus, 665 F.2d 480, 482
(4th Cir. 1981) (jurisdiction upheld; negotiations and delivery not performed in
forum state, but other contacts found to support jurisdiction); Wisconsin Elec. Mfg.
Co. v. Pennant Prods., 619 F.2d 676, 677 (7th Cir. 1980) (jurisdiction upheld;
sending of agents into the forum state deemed sufficient contact to justify exercise of
jurisdiction over principal), the means of communication used, see Mountaire Feeds,
Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651, 655 (8th Cir. 1982) (jurisdiction denied; all
business contacts either by phone or through the mails), and the relative aggressive-
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Rather, courts should examine the few factors that would indicate
that the control normally present in contract cases did not exist. For
example, a court should determine whether the defendant is one who
by occupation or status cannot choose the parties with whom it
deals. 2 Similarly, fraud or mistake would constitute other relevant
or
factors indicating a defendant's lack of control over the contract
83
knowledge of the true identity of the other contracting party.
If a court finds that the defendant possessed the requisite degree of
control over the activities in question, it must still proceed to the
second step of the analysis, in which it is to assess the burdens of
litigation on the respective parties.8 4 Evaluation of these burdens
entails a comparison of the cost of litigation with the defendant's
ability to fund that cost. 85 In cases dealing with large corporate entities, the cost of litigation in comparison to their vast resources would
almost never be found to present a burden. 86 In these cases the exercise
of jurisdiction would be proper. When the defendant's financial resources would be greatly strained by having to meet the costs of
litigation in the chosen forum, a court should investigate the feasibility of87litigation in an alternative forum less burdensome to the defendant.

ness of the parties in negotiating the contract, compare Schwilm v. Holbrook, 661
F.2d 12, 15 (3d Cir. 1981) (jurisdiction denied; local practice of doctor not involving
solicitation of out-of-state patients) with Neiman v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 619 F.2d
1189, 1193 (7th Cir.) (jurisdiction upheld; affirmative efforts of defendant to serve
markets for its products in other states), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1980).
82. See Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 517-19 (5th Cir. 1982) (State Bar
Association, which allowed all candidates to take the bar exam, not purposefully
availing itself of plaintiff's state by sending her exam results there); Schwilm v.
Holbrook, 661 F.2d 12, 13 (3d Cir. 1981) (hospital physician transferring out of state
patient to his domicile not purposefully availing himself of that state).
83. Unilateral mistake may result in a contract with a resident of a state different
from that contemplated by the contracting party. See Potueek v. Cordeleria Lourdes,
310 F.2d 527, 528-29 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 930 (1963); Lunn &
Sweet Co. v. Wolfman, 256 Mass. 436, 437-38, 153 N.E. 893, 893 (1926).
84. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
85. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Woods, supra note 1, at 892.
86. The litigation burdens imposed on large corporate entities are not discussed
in the majority of cases. But see Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878, 881 (10th
Cir. 1982) (citing mobile character of letters of credit and the volume in which they
are issued as reasons for denying jurisdiction); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina
Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing lack of direct transportation routes and need for translation of testimony as burdens to defendant Mexican
shipbuilders in Alaskan forum).
87. See Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 1982); Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1981); Woods,
supra note 1, at 892.
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C. The Inferiority of Other JurisdictionalAnalyses
Dissatisfaction with the Court's reliance on interstate federalism in
the World-Wide analysis prompted some courts and commentators to
use and propose alternative jurisdiction analyses.8 8 These analyses fall
into two categories: a fairness analysis 9 and a burdens analysis.9 0 The
fairness analysis typically explores such factors as the burdens of
litigation on the parties, 9 ' the interest of the forum state in the
litigation, 92 the convenience of the forum,9 3 and the availability of an
alternative forum .94 The burdens analysis examines whether the
defendant suffers any "meaningful inconvenience" in having to
litigate in the forum chosen by the plaintiff. 95
Neither analysis effectively protects an individual's due process
liberty interest. The major problem with the fairness analysis is that it
tends to be too subjective. 96 By factoring a state's sovereign interest
into the threshold step of the jurisdiction analysis, the defendant's

88. See Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1982) (reducing
purposeful availment standard to one consisting of many factors to be considered in a
fairness analysis); Alchemie Int'l, Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1039,
1046-54 (D.N.J. 1981) (using the state interest principles of McGee after World-Wide
in a fairness analysis); Clermont, Restating TerritorialJurisdiction and Venue For
State and Federal Courts, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 411, 447-48 (1981) (advocating the
rejection of the World-Wide analysis and the use of a test of reasonableness of

jurisdiction); McDougal, JudicialJurisdiction:From a Contacts to an Interest Analy-

sis, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1 passim (1982) (examining inadequacy of purposeful availment/minimum contacts approach; endorsing an interests analysis as the better
jurisdictional approach); Ratner, ProceduralDue Processand Jurisdiction to Adjudi-

cate: (a) Effective-Litigation Values vs. The TerritorialImperative (b) The Uniform

Child Custody JurisdictionAct, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 363, 371-72 (1980) (criticizing the
World-Wide Court for its failure to examine factors relevant to fairness); Redish,
supra note 2, at 1137-44 (proposing a burdens analysis).
89. For the most comprehensive discussion of a fairness analysis, see Woods,
supra note 1, at 890-98. See also Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 523 (5th Cir.
1982) (applying a fairness analysis after Bauxites); McDougal, supra note 88, at 10- 11
(describing the various fairness factors and the problem with the vagueness of the
term fairness).
90. Redish, supra note 2, at 1137-42.
91. See Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 1982); Alchemie Int'l,
Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1039, 1052-53 (D.N.J. 1981): McDougal,
supra note 88, at 11.
92. See Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1982); Alchemie
Int'l, Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1039, 1048 (D.N.J. 1981); McDougal,
supra note 88, at 17-19; Redish, supra note 2, at 1139-41.
93. Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1982); Alchemie Int'l,
Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1039, 1053 (D.N.J. 1981); McDougal, supra
note 88, at 11; see Redish, supra note 2, at 1141.
94. See Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 1982); Schwilm v.
Holbrook, 661 F.2d 12, 15 (3d Cir. 1981).
95. Redish, supra note 2, at 1138.
96. Louis, supra note 14, at 432.
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rights become too heavily dependent on the whim of the forum.
Uncertainty results from a multitude of courts defining the protean
term "'fairness,"9 8 and then attempting to balance the fairness factors
in various ways. 9 9 A common law that could be adequately
anticipated cannot result from the use of a test that balances interests,
without constitutional guidance, to achieve fairness. 00
Some fairness analyses require a minimum power basis, 10 1 that
being some affiliation of the defendant with the forum state. 102 Under
this kind of analysis, however, a "foreseeable" contact is sufficient
predicate for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. 0 3 Even when
courts using this analysis inquire into the purposefulness of10 4the
defendant's contacts, this is but one of many factors considered.
The burdens analysis also impairs a defendant's individual liberty
interest by allowing the assertion of jurisdiction whenever a defendant
is not "meaningfully inconvenienced." 0 5 This approach would allow
a state to hold a defendant amenable to suit in that state although the
defendant has had no affiliation with the state. 106 Even if a defendant
were to demonstrate "meaningful inconvenience," it could still be
subjected to suit in the forum with which it has no contacts if either
the forum state asserts an interest in the litigation 10 7 or the plaintiff
asserts that to sue the defendant elsewhere would be too difficult. 0 8

97. Id. at 431-32; see Lewis, The "Forum State Interest" Factor in Personal
Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33
Mercer L. Rev. 769, 818-19 (1982) (criticizing Professor Redish's approach).
98. See McDougal, supra note 88, at 10.
99. Louis, supra note 14, at 432.
100. McDougal, supra note 88, at 10 (noting that courts deal with relevant criteria
inconsistently and in a confusing manner); see Louis, supra note 14, at 432 (a broader
balancing approach "complicates the review of any decision reached because of the
multitude of relevant factors to be weighed, and thereby makes each decision
reached potentially distinguishable from any other").
101. See Burstein v. State-Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 1982); Alchemie Int'l,
Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1039, 1044 (D.N.J. 1981).
102. See Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1982) (court
reducing purposeful availment standard to one of many factors to consider); Alchemie Int'l, Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1039, 1052 (D.N.J. 1981) (forum
state's interest can be used to overcome the purposeful availment standard); see also
Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, 407 A.2d 1, 5 (Me. 1979) (purposeful availment standard
cannot be read literally).
103. See supra note 102.
104. See Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1982).
105. Redish, supra note 2, at 1138.
106. See id.
107. The state's interest must be of such magnitude that the state would apply its
law to the controversy. This would not be conclusive if a more convenient forum
would apply the state's law, and the law in question is neither novel nor unresolved.
Id. note 2, at 1139-41.
108. Id. at 1138 ("A court should first consider the relative burdens a denial of
jurisdiction would impose upon the plaintiff.") (emphasis in original).
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CONCLUSION

Personal jurisdiction analysis after Bauxites must focus clearly on
protecting a defendant's property and individual liberty interests. The
Supreme Court has provided an appropriate vehicle for protecting
these interests in the form of a purposeful availment contacts test. In
application, this test should protect the defendant from the burdens of
distant litigation, and also should afford the defendant the ability to
tailor its conduct to avoid amenability to suit in foreign jurisdictions.
Thomas L. Cronan, III

